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EASING AN IMPRACTICABLE STANDARD OF
PROOF: AMENDING TIRE FTDA TO OVERCOME
MOSELEY V. V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC.'S
ACTUAL DILUTION REQUIREMENT AND TO
PROVIDE A UNIFORM TEST FOR DILUTION
Lisa S. Yao*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In a single year, Victoria's Secret can spend over fifty-five
million dollars in brand advertisements to promote its highquality women's lingerie products.1 Congress sought to
protect such economic investments in goodwill and reputation
development embodied by a trademark2 when it enacted the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA)3 to provide mark
owners with a cause of action against dilution.4 Yet the
United States Supreme Court's recent ruling in Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc.5 has created a severe problem of proof

* Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 46; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A., International Relations, Stanford
University. She thanks Professor Tyler Ochoa for his guidance in writing this
comment, her family for their love and support, and Jennifer Jean Lee and
Michelle Lee Ho for their contributions.
1. In 1998 alone, the corporations that own the VICTORIA'S SECRET
trademark spent this amount advertising the brand. Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 422 (2003).
2. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030 ("The concept of dilution recognizes the substantial investment the
owner has made in the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark
itself, protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their own
gain.").
3. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat.
985 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2000)).
4. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, §§ 3-4, 109 Stat. at 985-86
("The term 'dilution' means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish [the owner's] goods or services .... ").
5. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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for trademark 6 dilution claims.7 Moseley frustrates this
congressional
purpose
by
imposing
a
virtually
insurmountable burden of proof on plaintiffs.8
If a defendant uses a mark similar to the plaintiff's mark,
then the plaintiff must show that the defendant's mark
caused actual dilution of her mark in order to obtain an
injunction.9 Since the definition of dilution is premised upon
a largely unquantifiable psychological phenomenon, it is
exceedingly difficult to meet this standard of proof. 10 For
example, it is impossible to measure the extent to which the
existence of Kodak automobiles sold by a defendant company
has weakened the tendency of a consumer to think of
cameras, film, and other goods sold by the Kodak trademark
owner when she encounters KODAK in the marketplace.
Market surveys can establish a likelihood of dilution by
showing that consumers have, at a minimum, formed a
mental association between the two marks, thereby
permitting the inference that use of the junior mark"
lessened the original mark's uniqueness. 2 However, Moseley
held that mere mental association is not sufficient to
establish dilution. 3 Following Moseley, courts have almost
uniformly dismissed dilution claims due to insufficient
evidence. 4 Such a result suggests that Moseley's actual
6. Trademark is defined as: "A word, phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol
used by a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from
those of others." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1530 (8th ed. 2004).

7. Amy E. Pulliam, Raising the Bar Too High: Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. and Relief Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 53 CATH.
U. L. REV. 887, 905 (2004) ("The Court recognized that in interpreting the
statute literally, it raised the bar and increased the burden of proof necessary
for owners of famous marks to recover under the Act.").
8. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
9. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34.
10. Jonathan Moskin, Victoria's Big Secret: Whither Dilution Under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act?, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 842, 843 (2003)
[hereinafter Moskin, Victoria'sBig Secret].
11. Between a plaintiff and a defendant, the first to use the mark in
question is referred to as the "senior user," and the one who uses the mark after
the senior user is known as the "junior user."
12. See Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law:
Secondary Meaning, Genericism,Fame, Confusion and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK
REP. 1013, 1047 (2001).

13. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433 ("[Mental association will not necessarily
reduce the capacity of the famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, the
statutory requirement for dilution under the FTDA.").
14. See Natalie M. Polzer, Note, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.: The

2006]

A UNIFORM TEST FOR DILUTION

679

dilution standard is unreasonably high and effectuates a
15
disregard for Congress's intent to protect trademark owners.
This comment first addresses the history of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act and the basic elements of a dilution
claim. 16 It will next discuss the existing split among circuit
courts of appeals concerning the standard for dilution and the
Supreme Court's decision in Moseley. 1
Specifically, this
comment examines the Court's adoption of an actual dilution
standard, the failure of the Court to articulate a test for
determining when actual dilution occurs, and the overall
impact Moseley has had on trademark dilution law.' 8 Finally,
this comment proposes an amendment to the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act that lowers the requisite standard of
proof from a showing of actual dilution to a likelihood of
dilution.19
This comment also evaluates the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA)2° that purports to
resolve the problems created by Moseley and suggests
modifications to the proposed legal test for deciding when
trademark dilution is likely to occur.2 '
II. BACKGROUND
A.

TraditionalTrademark Law Under the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act codifies federal trademark law.2 2 It
recognizes that the value of a trademark lies in its ability to
indicate the origin of goods with which it is associated.2 3
Under the Lanham Act, a valid trademark receives protection
against trademark infringement.24
Trademark infringement occurs when a defendant uses a
mark that is similar to that of the mark owner's, such that it

United States Supreme Court's Actual Harm Standard of Dilution Whittles
Away FTDA Protection Offered to Famous Trademarks, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV.
709, 757 (2004).
15. See discussion infra Part II.C.
16. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
17. See discussion infra Part II.D.
18. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
19. See discussion infra Part V.
20. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2006).
21. See discussion infra Parts II.F, IV.C-D.
22. See generally Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2000).
23. See generally id.
24. See id. § 1114.
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causes consumer confusion over the source of the goods.25
The principal concern of traditional trademark law, the
prevention of consumer confusion, serves both private and
public interests.2 6 By preventing competitors from marketing
goods under a confusingly similar mark, the action for
infringement provides assurance that competitors will not be
able to take a free ride on a trademark owner's investment in
the development and promotion of a desirable product.2 7 In
addition to protecting private interests, the action for
infringement also benefits the public.2 8
The absence of
confusingly similar marks makes it more likely that a
purchaser will get what she thinks she is getting when she
buys a product based on preference for a particular brand.29
For instance, a consumer may develop a loyalty to the CocaCola brand because, after years of consumption, she believes
it is a high-quality soft drink. Trademark law assures that
she will not have the opportunity to pick up a can of KokoKola mistakenly, which may have very different qualities due
to the fact that it was manufactured by a different company.
B. The Policies Underlying Trademark Dilution
Unlike traditional trademark law, trademark dilution
law is concerned only with the trademark owner's interests
and not with any public interests. 0 The concept of dilution

25. Id. For example, in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, a senior user
employed the name SLICKCRAFT to describe his line of racing boats and a
junior user adopted the name SLEEKCRAFT to describe a line of recreational
boats. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1979). The
court held that the junior user infringed the senior user's mark because
consumers were likely to believe mistakenly that SLICKCRAFT was affiliated
with or was produced by the manufacturers of SLEEKCRAFT. Id. at 348.
26. TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir.
2001) ("The action for infringement under the Lanham Act serves the interests
of consumers, as well as sellers, in having trademarks functions as sourceidentifiers.").
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. ("In contrast [to the action for infringement], the Dilution Act is
designed solely for the benefit of sellers."). There are two types of trademark
dilution. Polzer, supra note 14, at 713. Dilution by blurring refers to the
diminishing of a mark's ability to identify the product with which it is
associated. See id. at 713. On the other hand, dilution by tarnishment damages
positive associations with a particular trademark. See id. at 713. This
comment is concerned only with dilution by blurring.
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emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century when
companies started to use existing famous trademarks to
market their non-competing products. 3 '
For example,
producers used the mark ROLLS ROYCE to market radio
parts, VOGUE to market hats, KODAK to market bicycles,
and BEECH-NUT to market cigarettes. 2 Because consumers
recognized that these products bore no relation to the senior
users' products, the confusion-based trademark protection
3
under the Lanham Act provided no relief
Frank I. Schechter addressed this problem in his 1927
law review article, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection.
Courts and commentators consider Schechter's
article to be the seminal discussion of dilution theory.3 ' The
article proposed that the preservation of the uniqueness and
individuality of a trademark, rather than the designation of
source, is the primary purpose of the modern trademark.
Consequently, it should not matter whether the products
bearing the senior and junior marks are in direct
competition."
Although Kodak cameras do not compete
directly with Kodak bicycles, the junior use of KODAK to
refer to bicycles lessens the uniqueness of the senior KODAK
mark. As a remedy, Schechter advocated expanding classical
trademark protection to include protection against the
"gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold
upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon
non-competing goods."38
C. The FederalTrademark DilutionAct
As of 1995, only twenty-five states had laws that
prohibited trademark dilution.3 9 Thus, protection of famous
31. Brian A. Jacobs, Note, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 166 (2004).
32. Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of
Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 125 (1993) [hereinafter
Moskin, RationalLimits].
33. Jacobs, supra note 31, at 166.
34. Moskin, Rational Limits, supra note 32, at 125; Frank I. Schechter, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825 (1927).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Jacobs, supra note 31, at 166.
39. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030.
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marks often depended on whether the forum in which the suit
was filed had a dilution statute.4 ° In response, Congress
sought to create a federal dilution statute to deter forum
shopping. 41 The resulting Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995 amended the Lanham Act to protect against dilution.4 2
The amendment defines dilution as "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods
or services, regardless of the presence or absence of-(1)
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other
43
parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."
In a House Report on the FTDA, Congress expressly
highlighted the difference between the type of harm the
FTDA addresses and the problem traditional trademark law
addresses.4 4 The House Report characterized dilution as "an
injury that differs materially from that arising out of the
orthodox confusion."4 5 It emphasized that "[elven in the
absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be
debilitated by another's use. .. Confusion leads to immediate
injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to
spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the
46

mark."

The amendment also added section 43(c) of the Lanham
Act, which states:

40. Id. at 4.
41. Id. Congress also desired to create a federal dilution statute to facilitate
the executive branch's negotiations with other nations "to secure greater
protection for the famous marks owned by U.S. companies." Id. "[Tihe recently
concluded Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS) which was part of the Uruguay
Round of the GATT agreement include[d] a provision designed to provide
dilution protection to famous marks." Id. Thus, Congress's enactment of the
FTDA would "be consistent with the terms of the [GATT] agreement, as well as
the Paris Convention, of which the U.S. [is] also a member." Id. Foreign
nations would be reluctant to modify their laws "to protect famous U.S. marks if
the United States itself does not afford special protection for such marks." Id.
42. See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir.
2001) ("[The Dilution Act is designed solely for the benefit of sellers. Its
purpose is to protect the owners of famous marks from the kind of dilution that
is permitted by the trademark laws when a junior user uses the same mark in a
non-confusing way in an unrelated area of commerce.")
43. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 4, 109
Stat. 985, 986 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
44. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled . . . to an
injunction against another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins
after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of
the distinctive quality of the mark.. .

Thus, section 43(c) sets forth the five basic elements of a
dilution claim: (1) the senior mark must be famous; 4 (2) the
senior mark must be distinctive; 9 (3) the junior use must be a
commercial use in commerce; (4) the junior use must begin
after the senior mark has become famous; and (5) the junior
use must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior
mark.5 ° While establishing of the first four elements is
relatively easy, there is a split among the circuit courts of
appeals regarding the interpretation of the fifth element.5 '
D. Pre-Moseley: Circuit Split on Actual Dilution vs.
Likelihood of Dilution
After the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
the circuit courts of appeals came to different conclusions
regarding the correct interpretation of the fifth dilution
element.52 The Fourth and Fifth Circuits interpreted the
phrase "causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
[senior] mark" to mean that a showing of actual dilution is
required for relief under the FTDA.53 In contrast, the Second,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits interpreted this phrase to mean
that a showing of actual dilution is not necessary.5 4

47. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, § 3(c)(1), 109 Stat. at 985
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125).
48. This section also provides a list of eight factors to aid in determining
whether a mark if famous. Id. at 985-86. These factors include the duration
and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with
which the mark is used; the geographical extent of the trading area in which the
mark is used; and the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used. Id. at 985.
49. The eight factors for determining famousness also aid in determining
distinctiveness. Id.
50. Id.
51. See discussion infra Part II.D.
52. See Pulliam, supra note 7, at 890.
53. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v.
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Westchester Media v. PRL USA
Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th Cir. 2000).
54. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 1999),
overruled in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. 418; V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley,
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The Fourth Circuit asserted its position in Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development.55 The plaintiff, Ringling
Brothers-Barnum & Bailey's circus, owned the trademarked
slogan, THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH.5 6 When it
discovered that the State of Utah was using THE GREATEST
SNOW ON EARTH as its slogan to encourage tourism, it
sued Utah for injunctive relief and claimed that defendant's
use of the slogan violated the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act.5 The plaintiff argued that proof that viewers formed a
mental association between the two slogans was sufficient to
prove dilution.58 However, the court rejected this argument
and held that, in order to prove dilution, the mental
association must have caused actual economic harm by
reducing the famous mark's selling power.5 9 Since the
plaintiff was unable to provide proof of economic harm, the
court found no dilution. 0 Shortly thereafter, the Fifth Circuit
also adopted an "actual harm" standard in Westchester Media
v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.6 1

259 F.3d 464, 471-76 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled in part by
Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
55. See RinglingBros., 170 F.3d at 464.
56. Id. at 451. The plaintiff had been using this slogan since 1872. Id.
57. Id. at 451-52.
58. Id. at 452 ("Ringling took the position that as a matter of statutory
interpretation, 'dilution' by 'blurring' occurs whenever a junior mark is either
identical to or sufficiently similar to the famous mark that persons viewing the
two instinctively will make a 'mental association' between the two.").
59. Id. at 458. The court focused on the contrast between the express
language of the state and federal anti-dilution statutes. Id. While the state
statutes specifically sought to protect famous marks from the likelihood of
dilution, the federal statute did not employ such language. Id. The court used
this difference to conclude that the federal statute required proof of actual
dilution. See id. Since dilution is defined as the reduction in capacity of a
famous mark's selling power, the court ultimately held that for mere mental
association to qualify as proof of dilution, it must have caused some economic
harm. Id.
60. Id. at 459.
61. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th
Cir. 2000). Ralph Lauren's PRL is a fashion and design company. Id. at 661.
Westchester, a magazine publisher, purchased POLO magazine, a special
interest publication focusing on polo and equestrian concerns. Id. After
purchasing POLO magazine, Westchester reinvented POLO as a magazine that
covered not only the sport of polo, but also the lifestyle associated with the
sport. Id. at 662. As part of this re-launch, Westchester promoted POLO to
customers of Neiman Marcus, one of PRL's largest retailers. Id. Additionally,
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Conversely, the Second Circuit rejected the Fourth
Circuit's "actual harm" standard in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc.62 It noted that the actual dilution requirement
would create severe problems of proof for the plaintiff.6 3 For
example, during profitable times, the plaintiff may be unable
to show diminished revenues, even if the junior use clearly
lessens the distinctiveness of the senior mark.6 Moreover,
even if economic loss could be shown, it could be difficult to
attribute such loss to dilution of the mark.65 Thus, the
Second Circuit rejected the "actual harm" standard in favor of
a "likelihood of harm" standard.6 6
The Seventh Circuit also adopted this standard in Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc. 67 It echoed the Second
Circuit's sentiment that the Fourth and Fifth Circuit's "actual
harm" requirement held plaintiffs to an impossible standard

Westchester chose Claudia Schiffer, a model often featured in PRL campaigns,
to appear on one of POLO's cover pages. Id. Westchester brought an action
against PRL seeking declaratory relief, stating that its use of the word "POLO"
did not infringe upon PRL's POLO trademark; PRL counterclaimed asserting
federal trademark dilution. Id. at 663. In deciding the case, the Fifth Circuit
adopted the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of federal dilution. Id. at 670. It
held that the FTDA requires proof of actual harm to show dilution of a
trademark, and that PRL had no actionable dilution claim because it could not
show actual harm. See id. at 671.
62. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled
in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). The case
arose when Pepperidge Farm claimed that Nabisco's creation of a fish-shaped
cracker diluted the product configuration mark of Pepperidge Farm's famous
Goldfish snack. Id. at 212-14. Pepperidge Farm has produced its Goldfish
crackers since 1962, and has obtained several trademark registrations for the
Goldfish name and design. Id. at 212. Like Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish
cracker, Nabisco's cracker was bite-sized, orange, cheddar cheese-flavored, and
goldfish-shaped. Id. at 213.
63. Id. at 223-24.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 224.
66. Id. at 223. Applying this standard, the court found that because there
was a high likelihood that Nabisco's junior mark would dilute the
distinctiveness of Pepperidge Farm's senior mark, it could properly grant
Pepperidge Farm's preliminary injunction motion. Id. at 222.
67. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir.
2000), overruled in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. 418. The plaintiff pharmaceutical
company had owned the trademark for the prescription drug PROZAC since
1985. Id. at 461. Natural Answers, an Internet-based herbal medicine
company, began marketing HERBROZAC as a natural, non-prescription
alternative to PROZAC. Id. at 460. Eli Lilly claimed dilution under the FTDA
and sued to enjoin Natural Answers from using the name HERBROZAC. Id. at
460-61.
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of proof.6" The court reasoned that Congress would not be so
inefficient as to create a cause of action that could not be
proven.6 9 Additionally, the court noted that the FTDA's main
remedy was to provide injunctions against the future
exploitation of senior marks. 0
It stated that an
interpretation of the "causes dilution" element that requires
proof of actual economic harm would essentially defeat the
purpose of the FTDA's primary remedy.7 1 In other words, by
the time plaintiffs could show actual harm had occurred, they
would already have sustained damages that the FTDA's
injunction was designed to prevent.72 Thus, an actual harm
standard is contrary to Congress's intent in enacting the
FTDA.78
E. 'Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc. to decide whether proof of actual
economic injury to a famous mark is required to gain relief
under the FTDA.74 In Moseley, defendants Victor and Cathy
Moseley owned a retail store which specialized in adult videos
and adult novelties. 5
The plaintiffs were affiliated
corporations
that owned the VICTORIA'S SECRET
trademark. 6 Initially, defendants' store was named "Victor's
Secret." 77 Upon learning of the store's existence, Victoria's
Secret's counsel wrote to defendants asking them to
discontinue use of "Victor's Secret" because it was likely to
cause dilution under the FTDA.7" In response, the Moseleys
79
changed the store name to "Victor's Little Secret."

68. Id. at 468. The court noted that particularly for profitable products such
as Eli Lilly's PROZAC, "it is possible that the distinctiveness of its mark could
be diluted even as its sales are increasing, albeit not increasing as much as they
would in the absence of the offending mark." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 467.
71. Id. (citing Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir.
1999)).
72. See id. at 467-68.
73. See Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 468.
74. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 421-22 (2003).
75. Id. at 422, 424.
76. Id. at 422.
77. Id. at 423.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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0
Unsatisfied with this change, plaintiffs filed suit.8
The district court found the two marks similar enough to
dilute the Victoria's Secret mark under the FTDA, and
consequently granted an injunction prohibiting the Moseleys
from using their store name."' On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling. 2 In doing so, the court
sided with the Second and Seventh Circuits and rejected the
Fourth Circuit's holding that relief under the FTDA requires
actual economic harm. 3
When defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, the
Court interpreted the FTDA to require actual dilution.84 The
Court first focused on a comparison of state and federal
dilution statutes. 5 It pointed out that many state dilution
laws expressly require a showing of only a likelihood of
dilution to obtain injunctive relief.8 6 Similarly, the Court
noted that several other provisions in the federal Lanham Act
contain references to a "likelihood" of harm. In contrast, the
relevant text of the FTDA provides that owners of famous
marks are entitled to injunctive relief against another
person's use of a mark if that use "causes dilution of the
distinctive quality" of the famous mark. 8 By comparing the
wording of the FTDA with language of the state dilution
statutes and the rest of the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court
concluded that the text of the FTDA required a showing of
actual dilution. 9

80. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423.
81. Id. at 425.
82. Id.
83. Pulliam, supra note 7, at 901.
84. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433 ("The contrast between the initial reference to
an actual 'lessening of the capacity' of the mark, and the later reference to a
'likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception' in the second caveat confirms the
conclusion that actual dilution must be established.").
85. Id. at 430-34.
86. The Court raised as an example the Massachusetts dilution statute,
which provided: "Likelihood ... of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade
name or trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of trademark infringement...." 1947 Mass. Acts. page 300, ch. 307, quoted in Moseley,
537 U.S. at 430.
87. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432.
88. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(c)(1),
109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000)); Moseley,
537 U.S. at 432-33.
89. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433 (suggesting that Congress's use of "likelihood"
when referring to confusion, but not when referring to dilution, implies its
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The Court found that the definition of dilution provided
in section 45 of the FTDA reinforced this interpretation.9" As
previously mentioned, the FTDA defines dilution as "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or
absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous
mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception."9 ' The Court viewed the contrast
between the initial reference to a "lessening of the capacity" of
a mark and the subsequent use of the word "likelihood" in the
second caveat as further proof that the FTDA requires actual
dilution.9 2 Based on these two comparisons, the Supreme
Court concluded that the plain language of the FTDA called
for a showing of actual dilution in order to gain injunctive
93
relief.
Although the Court resolved the circuit split by firmly
establishing that the FTDA requires a showing of "actual
dilution" instead of a "likelihood of dilution," 94 the test for
dilution remains unsettled.
The Court in Moseley did not
delineate a clear test for dilution, but rather, it briefly
discussed the sufficiency of various types of evidence. 96 The
Court first expressly rejected the idea that a demonstration of
economic loss is necessary to prove dilution.
While holding
that the FTDA requires a showing of actual dilution to gain
relief, the Court admitted "that does not mean that the
consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales or

intent to require actual harm).
90. Id.
91. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, § 4, 109 Stat. at 986 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
92. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See discussion infra Part III. The courts that adhered to a likelihood of
dilution standard before the Supreme Court decided Moseley used different
factors to test for dilution. See discussion infra Part IV.A. The Second Circuit
employed a total of ten factors. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208,
217-22 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. 418; see infra note
186 (listing the ten factors). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit considered only
two factors: the strength of the senior mark and the similarity between the
senior and junior marks. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456,
469 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
96. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34.
97. Id. at 433.
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profits, must also be proved.""8 In addition, the Court agreed
with the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Ringling Bros. that
unless the marks at issue are identical, the mere fact that
consumers mentally associate the junior mark with the senior
mark is not enough to prove dilution.9 9
The Court acknowledged that it might be difficult to
obtain direct evidence that a famous mark is less useful in
distinguishing a brand, but maintained that it is still possible
to meet the actual dilution standard. 10 So long as plaintiffs
can prove actual dilution through circumstantial evidence,
the Court stated, direct evidence of dilution is unnecessary. 10 1
In cases where the marks at issue are identical, the
indistinguishable nature of the marks by itself constitutes
circumstantial evidence of actual dilution. 10 2 For example, if
an automobile manufacturer began using Kodak's red and
orange symbol to market its cars, it is logical to assume this
use lessens the capacity of Kodak's mark to identify and
distinguish its cameras. If the marks are not identical,
however, it is unclear what is acceptable as circumstantial
evidence.
Thus, on one hand, mental association by itself is
insufficient to prove dilution.' ° On the other hand, it is not
necessary for a plaintiff to prove she has sustained actual
04
economic losses as a result of the offensive junior use.'
Beyond these basic boundaries, the Court suggested that in
some cases plaintiffs may use circumstantial evidence to
prove dilution.0 5 However, the Court referred only to cases
where the marks at issue are identical. 0 6 Where the marks
are similar but not identical, the Court offered no guidance on
how to proceed.

98. Id.
99. See id. at 434.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34.
103. Id. at 433.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 434.
106. Id. (declaring that actual dilution can reliably be proven through
circumstantial evidence and that the obvious example would be a case where
the junior and senior marks are identical).
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The Trademark DilutionRevision Act of 2006

The difficulties of proof that Moseley created for plaintiffs
attempting to state a dilution claim generated support for an
amendment to the FTDA. 10 7
The latest proposal is the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, which has passed
both the House and the Senate. 10 8 While dissatisfaction with
Moseley's actual dilution standard served as the impetus for
the TDRA, the drafters addressed other issues upon which
circuit courts disagreed. 10 9
Among numerous proposed
changes, there are two that are critically relevant to this
comment's focus. Most importantly, the TDRA strikes the
actual dilution language in favor of a likelihood of dilution
standard.1 10 The proposed bill would also employ a six-factor
balancing test for determining when dilution will likely
occur."' It states:
In determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to
cause dilution by blurring, the court may consider all
relevant factors, including the following:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade
name and the famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of
the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is
engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name
intended to create an association with the famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade
name and the famous mark." 2
The "may consider" phrasing means that these factors
are permissive, instead of mandatory."' It also means that

107. DAVID, S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (Supp. 2005).

108. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2006).
109. WELKOWITZ, supra note 107, at 52.

110.
111.
112.
113.

H.R. 683.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
WELKOWITZ, supra note 107, at 53.
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this list of factors is not exhaustive." 4 Currently, the TDRA
is awaiting finalization by the1 5 conference committee before it
is presented to the President.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Moseley created two problems for the legal community.
First, its actual dilution standard frustrates the purposes of
the FTDA by imposing on the plaintiff an impracticable
standard of proof." 6 Congress enacted the FTDA to protect
the economic investments of mark owners by providing both a
cause of action against dilution and injunctive relief to
prevent the future exploitation of a plaintiffs marks. 1 7 The
Supreme Court's holding that the FTDA requires a showing
of actual dilution raised the burden of proof, making it
unusually difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on their trademark
dilution claims."18 Even if plaintiffs managed to show actual
dilution, by then they already would have sustained the
damages the injunctions were meant to prevent." 9 To
remedy this problem, Congress must pass the pending
requires a likelihood of dilution
amendment to the FTDA that
120
rather than actual dilution.
The second problem is that Moseley neglected to
articulate a test for determining when dilution has
occurred.' 21 Even if Congress amends the dilution standard,
the problem of how to determine a likelihood of dilution
remains. To gain relief, plaintiffs must produce either direct
or circumstantial evidence of dilution, 22 neither of which is

114. Id.
115. H.R. 683: Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, GovTrack.us,
httpJ/www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-683 (last visited April 22,
2006).
116. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
117. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir.
2000), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418
(2003).
118. Pulliam, supra note 7, at 908-10. This difficulty is further illustrated
by the cases decided after Moseley. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
119. Pulliam, supra note 7, at 908-10.
120. See discussion supra Part II.F.
121. Polzer, supra note 14, at 743 ("The Moseley Court's interpretation of the

FTDA to require actual dilution without stating what proof of actual dilution
would look like, essentially made relief for famous marks infinitely more

difficult.").
122.

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003).
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an easy task.
Direct evidence of dilution is difficult to obtain because
the concept of dilution is premised on a psychological
The
phenomenon that is largely unquantifiable. 123
acquisition of circumstantial evidence is also problematic
because the Supreme Court has given scant guidance on what
qualifies as such evidence. 1 24 In cases where junior and
senior marks are identical, the mere fact that the two marks
are identical qualifies as circumstantial evidence of actual
dilution. 25 However, it remains unclear what constitutes
circumstantial evidence in cases where the marks are only
highly similar. 26 The Court's failure to provide express
of when
guidelines effectively leaves the determination
27
discretion.
courts'
dilution occurs to lower
To correct this problem, Congress should create a
uniform test for dilution to which lower courts must adhere.
The TDRA's six-factor balancing test does not adequately
accomplish this goal because it is permissive rather than
mandatory. 2 8 Since the list of factors is not exhaustive,
courts will feel compelled to address these six factors, but
may look to additional considerations. Moreover, one of the
factors of the TDRA balancing test is problematic. The fourth
factor, which asks courts to consider a mark's fame, does not
129
serve the broader policies of intellectual property law.
Accordingly, Congress should mandate several of the more
important factors and eliminate the fame factor.
IV. ANALYSIS

A. Case Law After Moseley Indicates a Need for a Uniform
Test for Dilution
The Supreme Court's failure to articulate a test for
123. Moskin, Victoria's Big Secret, supra note 10, at 855-56.
124. Jacobs, supra note 31, at 170.
125. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
126. Jacobs, supra note 31, at 170.
127. See Pulliam, supra note 7, at 905 ("Absent express guidelines, the
burden shifts to the lower courts to establish a test for a sufficient showing of
actual dilution.").
128. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
129. Fame may be an indicator that defendants will get a free ride on
plaintiffs trademark, but intellectual property law does not prohibit free-riding
in all instances.
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dilution in Moseley makes it difficult for plaintiffs to prevail
on their federal trademark dilution claims. Since Moseley, a
significant number of dilution claims have been dismissed
due to the absence of sufficient evidence, whether direct or
130
circumstantial, under Moseley's actual dilution standard.
The outcome of such cases indicates the need for a lower
standard and a clear test for dilution.
In Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., Ty, the manufacturer of
"Beanie Babies," brought suit against Softbelly's for
Softbelly's
trademark dilution under the FTDA. 131
manufactured "Screenie Beanies," which are plush animalshaped toys stuffed with bean-like material to give the toys a
"Screenie Beanies" are used to wipe
floppy quality. 132
computer screens and differ from "Beanie Babies" only by the
material used on the bellies. 3 3 Ty claimed that Softbelly's
use of "Screenie Beanies" diluted Ty's registered trademark
for "Beanie Babies." 34 Although the district court ruled as a
matter of law that Softbelly's use of the term "Beanies"
135 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
diluted Ty's mark,
1 36
Circuit reversed.
The Seventh Circuit referred to the Supreme Court's
holding in Moseley and stated that if Ty could not provide
direct evidence of dilution, such as consumer surveys, it could
still prove dilution through circumstantial evidence.1 37 Under
this analysis, the Seventh Circuit found that Ty did not meet
Because the court
Moseley's actual dilution standard. 38
found "Beanie Babies" was not identical to "Screenie
marks to show
Beanies," Ty could not rely on 1identical
39
circumstantial evidence of dilution.
Although the court adhered to Moseley's actual dilution
standard and ruled in favor of Softbelly's, parts of the opinion

130. Polzer, supra note 14, at 757 ("Though few cases have applied Moseley,
lower courts stated it is more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on an FTDA claim
in light of the Moseley decision.").
131. Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 535.
136. Id. at 537.
137. Ty, Inc., 353 F.3d at 536.
138. See id. at 535-36.
139. Id. at 536.

694

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 46

suggest the court was dissatisfied with the actual dilution
standard and frustrated with the lack of a clear test for
dilution. The court emphasized that although the Supreme
Court allowed the presence of identical junior and senior
marks to qualify as circumstantial evidence of actual dilution,
it did not say what else might be considered circumstantial
evidence. 140 The court also seemed to disagree with the
Supreme Court's view of consumer surveys as direct evidence
of actual dilution.14 ' The court was skeptical that consumer
surveys could accurately gauge a mark's ability to lessen the
capacity of a senior mark to identify or distinguish itself:
"Me are not sure what question could be put to consumers
that would elicit a meaningful answer either in [Moseley] or
this [case] .142
Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc. is another post-Moseley
case in which the plaintiff did not prevail because it failed to
present evidence of actual dilution. 4
Kellogg is a cereal
producer that, since 1963 has used advertising containing
Toucan Sam, a cartoon rendition of a toucan with a multicolored body and cheery demeanor.144
In 1994, TGI, a
manufacturer of golf equipment, began using a toucan
drawing and the word mark TOUCAN GOLD to represent its
products. 145 TGI's toucan is also an artist's rendition of a
toucan that possesses a multi-colored body.'4 6
However,
unlike Toucan Sam, the TGI toucan wears no human
expressions. 14 7 Kellogg filed suit against TGI and claimed
that TGI's word mark and toucan logo diluted Kellogg's five
federally-registered "Toucan Sam" word marks and logos."
The Sixth Circuit decided in favor of TGI by using two of
Kellogg's own surveys to find there was no direct evidence of
actual dilution. 149
For instance, a 1991 Kellogg study
indicated that ninety-four percent of children recognized
Toucan Sam, and eighty-one percent of children mentally
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 535.
Id.
Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 628-29 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 620.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Id. at 620-21..
See Kellogg Co., 337 F.3d at 624.
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associated Toucan Sam with Froot Loops. 15 0 A Kellogg study
conducted in 1997, after TGI came into existence, showed
15 1
that ninety-four percent of adults recognized Toucan Sam.
The court concluded from these studies that Kellogg failed to
present direct evidence of any reduction in the number of
people, in any population segment, who recognized Toucan
Sam as the spokesbird for Froot Loops.5 2 Therefore, Kellogg
failed to show that15 3TGI's toucan logo and word mark resulted
in actual dilution.
Although the court did not specifically discuss
circumstantial evidence, it discussed the similarity between
Kellogg's Toucan Sam and TGI's toucan logo and word
mark. 5 Far from finding the two marks identical, the court
emphasized the contrast between the anthropomorphic
nature of Toucan Sam and the life-like characteristics of the
Toucan Gold toucan: "[The Toucan Gold bird] has the look
and proportions of a toucan that one would encounter in the
wild.... [Toucan Sam] smiles and has several other human
features. We therefore find no similarity between Toucan
Sam and [the Toucan Gold bird]. " 155 Given this difference,
Kellogg could not rely on similarity of marks as
1 56
circumstantial evidence of dilution.
B. The Actual Dilution Standardis Impracticable
Although the Supreme Court in Moseley correctly applied
a rigid interpretation of the FTDA, the resulting actual
dilution standard has proven unworkable and defeats the
congressional intent behind the statute. As the post-Moseley
cases illustrate, the actual dilution standard is impracticable
because dilution is difficult to quantify. Trademark dilution
is based on the idea that companies build goodwill with their
consumers. 57 The problem is that goodwill, defined as the
"vague favorable disposition [a consumer has] towards a

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 628.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 626.
Kellogg Co., 337 F.3d at 626.
See id. at 628-29.
Moskin, Victoria'sBig Secret, supra note 10, at 856.
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product or service," is difficult to measure. 18
As one
trademark specialist described it:
Because goodwill, like personal reputation, cannot
meaningfully be said to "exist" in any physical sense in
one's conscious or unconscious mind, it is misleading (if
superficially tempting) to picture a physical thing being
eroded or worn away. Imagine, for instance, trying to
measure over time how much you like a flavor of ice cream
or wine vintage; even if you are convinced your feelings
have changed, how do you establish a baseline or prove
the extent of a change?.. 9
The reality that the psychological phenomenon of dilution
is largely unquantifiable may explain lower courts' rulings in
post-Moseley trademark dilution cases.16
The few courts
that have applied Moseley have found it is harder for
plaintiffs to prevail on an FTDA claim under an actual
161
dilution standard.
Even though Moseley allows plaintiffs to present
consumer surveys or economic harm162 as direct evidence of
dilution,'6 3 these types of direct evidence are exceedingly
difficult to obtain because dilution is so difficult to quantify.
As the Seventh Circuit in Ty implied, a consumer survey
cannot reliably assess the extent to which a mark's selling
power has been diluted if consumers themselves cannot truly
measure in their own minds the4 decrease in appeal of a
16
product associated with the mark.
It is also hard to show economic harm as direct evidence
of dilution. During profitable times, a plaintiff might not be
able to show diminished revenues even if the junior use
lessened the capacity of the senior mark to identify and

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 855-56.
161. Polzer, supra note 14, at 757.
162. Although Moseley established that showing economic harm is not
necessary, it is discussed here because it is a type of direct evidence that is
theoretically useful in proving actual dilution, but is very difficult to obtain in
practice due to the fact that dilution is an unquantifiable psychological
phenomenon. Moskin, Victoria's Big Secret, supra note 10, at 855-56. The
difficulty of showing economic harm supports the argument that direct evidence
of dilution is generally hard to obtain.
163. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003).
164. Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 535 (7th Cir. 2003).
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distinguish goods.' 65 Even if the plaintiff could show economic
166
loss, it is difficult to attribute those losses to dilution.
Although circumstantial evidence is less problematic, the
only type of circumstantial evidence the Supreme Court
mentioned in Moseley was the identical nature of junior and
senior marks. 167 Beyond this example, the Court gave no
indication of what else might qualify as circumstantial

evidence. 168
The post-Moseley cases strongly suggest that lower
courts tend to reject dilution claims where the marks at issue
are not identical. 169 Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc. is an apt
illustration of this trend. 170
Despite "Screenie Beanies"
overall similarity to "Beanie Babies" in that both are plush,
floppy, bean-stuffed animal toys with similar sounding
names, the Seventh Circuit focused on the difference in the
material used to create the belly in each of the toys and
decided that the toys were not identical. 71 Thus, Ty could not
argue the identical nature of the toys as circumstantial
evidence of actual dilution. 72
Similarly in Kellogg, the two marks at issue bore a
73
resemblance to one another, yet fell short of being identical.
Although both marks were artistic depictions of toucans with
colorful bodies, one was artistic and one was fanciful. 74 The
Sixth Circuit found there was no circumstantial evidence of
actual dilution due to the contrast between the Toucan Gold
toucan's life-like features and Toucan Sam's anthropomorphic
features. 175 Along with Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., this post-

165. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1999),
overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434
(2003).
166. Id. at 224.
167. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
168. See id.
169. Polzer, supra note 14, at 757 ("Though Moseley did not require marks to
be identical to receive protection from dilution but stated that circumstantial
evidence may show dilution, lower courts applying Moseley have rejected
dilution claims where the marks differ from famous marks in sound,
appearance and meaning.").
170. Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 2003).
171. Id. at 530-36.
172. Id. at 536.
173. Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 626 (6th Cir. 2003).
174. Id. at 620-22.
175. Id. at 626.
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Moseley case illustrates the impracticability of the actual
dilution standard.
C. Evaluationof the Factorsto Considerin Testing for
Dilution
17 6
The six-factor balancing test proposed by the TDRA
includes some factors that are based on the forms of
circumstantial evidence used by circuit courts prior to
Moseley.'77 Of these six factors, the first three are essential to
a proper determination of whether dilution has occurred. 7 '
The fourth factor is problematic because it undermines
intellectual property policies. 179 The fifth and sixth factors
may make the balancing test more robust, but are not
80
necessary.
1.

EssentialFactors-Similarityand Distinctiveness

The first factor of the six-factor balancing test refers to
similarity."18 Similarity of a junior mark to a senior mark is
an important form of circumstantial evidence. 182 The degree
to which consumers mentally associate a junior mark with a
senior mark is logically a function of the degree of
resemblance between the two marks. Without a modicum of
similarity, there can be no causal connection between the use
of a junior mark and dilution of a senior mark. As the Second
Circuit declared, the marks at issue "must be of sufficient
similarity so that, in the mind of the consumer, the junior
mark will conjure an association with the senior. In that
manner the junior mark will lessen the distinctiveness of the
" 183
senior mark.
176. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2006);
see supra note 112 and accompanying text (listing the six factors).
177. For example, similarity and distinctiveness are factors the Second
Circuit used prior to Moseley. Fame is a factor that the Seventh Circuit used
prior to Moseley. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1-2.
178. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1.
179. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
180. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.
181. See H.R. 683; supra note 112 and accompanying text (listing the six
factors).
182. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999),
overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
183. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 218. The mental association required by some
circuits was overruled by Moseley. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S.
418, 433 (2003). However, prior to Moseley, the Second Circuit applied the
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The second and third factors, the "degree of inherent or
acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark" and the "extent
to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in
substantially exclusive use of the mark," essentially refer to
distinctiveness."l ' Distinctiveness is an important form of
circumstantial evidence .

5

As the Second Circuit noted, in

addition to being a statutory element of the FTDA,
distinctiveness has a significant bearing on whether a junior
use is likely to dilute. 8 6 After all, how can the use of a junior
mark dilute a 8senior
mark if the senior mark is not distinctive
7
to begin with?

The court explained that distinctiveness is measurable on
a scale arranged according to the inherent strength or
weakness of the mark. 88 At the weak end of the scale, there
are generic words, or words that simply name the genus of
the product to which the mark applies. 8 9 These words are
devoid of distinctiveness and are ineligible for protection as

mental association standard to find that although Nabisco's fish cracker was not
identical to Pepperidge Farm's fish cracker, it was essentially the same in
shape, size, color, and flavor. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 218. Therefore,
Nabisco's junior use was similar enough to lessen, in the minds of consumers,
the uniqueness of Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish. Id.
184. See generally H.R. 683.
185. See Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 215.
186. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 217. The Second Circuit borrowed some of the
factors used in trademark infringement cases to aid in determining whether
Nabisco's junior use diluted Pepperidge Farm's mark. Id. at 217 (noting that
the court was adopting an approach similar to the Polaroid factors as found in
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)).
In total, Nabisco considered ten factors: (1) distinctiveness; (2) similarity of the
marks; (3) proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap; (4)
interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior mark, the similarity of
the junior mark, and the proximity of the products; (5) shared consumers and
geographic limitations; (6) sophistication of consumers; (7) actual confusion; (8)
adjectival or referential quality of the junior use; (9) harm to the junior user and
delay by the senior user; (10) and effect of the senior's prior laxity in protecting
the mark. Id. at 217-22.
187. Since dilution is "the lessening of the capacity of a mark to identify and
distinguish goods," 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000), if the senior mark is not distinctive
to begin with, it cannot have had much of an ability identify and distinguish
goods. See Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 216-17.
188. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 215.
189. Id. For example, a manufacturer or seller could not have the exclusive
right to use a generic word such as "cracker" to describe a cracker product.
Allowing the exclusive right to use such generic words would inhibit
competition because companies could no longer refer to their products by name.
Id.

700

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 46

marks.1 90 Next on the scale are "descriptive" marks, or those
that do little more than describe a product's attributes. 19'
These also have low distinctiveness and are ineligible for
protection unless they have acquired a secondary meaning.19 2
Next on the scale are "suggestive" marks, which suggest the
product's qualities.193
These have a moderate level 194
of
protection.
some
accorded
thus
are
and
distinctiveness
Highest on the scale are marks that are "arbitrary" or
"fanciful."' 95
Because these marks have no logical
relationship to the product for which they are used, they
possess a high level of distinctiveness and therefore are
196
accorded a high degree of protection.
Distinctiveness should not be confused with fame,
however. As the Second Circuit noted, a mark can be famous
without being distinctive.' 97 AMERICAN AIRLINES, ACE
HARDWARE, and UNITED AIRLINES are all examples of
marks that are famous, but that are not inherently distinctive
or have not acquired distinctiveness. As such, these marks
lack the precise attribute the FTDA meant to protect. 198 In
other words, if a mark is non-distinctive to begin with, it
cannot be diluted. Thus, distinctiveness is valuable because
it screens out marks that are not deserving of protection
under the FTDA.
The use of similarity as a factor provides additional aid in
screening out meritless claims under the FTDA. Taken
together, the distinctiveness factors and the similarity factor

190. Id. at 215.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4,
10 (2d Cir. 1976)) When a substantial segment of potential consumers have
come to recognize the mark as an indicator of source, Jacoby, supra note 12, at
1031, the descriptive mark is said to have acquired a secondary meaning and, as
such, it deserves some protection. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 215.
193. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 215.
194. Id. at 215-16.
195. Id. at 216 (citingAbercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11).
196. The Nabisco court, for example, implied that because a cracker and a
goldfish shape have no logical connection to one another, the Goldfish mark falls
into the "arbitrary" category. Id. at 217. Thus, the Goldfish mark is distinctive
enough to satisfy the distinctiveness element of the FTDA as well as one of the
factors of the Second Circuit's test for dilution. Id. at 218.
197. Id. at 216.
198. See id. ("A mark that, notwithstanding its fame, has no distinctiveness
is lacking the very attribute that the antidilution statute seeks to protect.").
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can help identify situations where dilution is likely.19 9 These
three factors should be a mandatory part of any effective test
for dilution.
2. A ProblematicFactor-Fame
In contrast to the first three factors, the fourth factor of
the TDRA may hinder the effectiveness of the proposed
balancing test. Fame is a factor considered by some courts,
such as the Seventh Circuit. 0 0 At first blush, it makes sense
to look at the degree of recognition of a mark when
determining whether a junior use of that mark results in
dilution.2 ' However, it does not necessarily follow that the
more famous a mark, the more harm a junior use of that
mark will cause a plaintiff.
It is possible that courts look to the degree of recognition
of a mark because they intend to punish free-riding,
reasoning that the more famous a mark, the more likely it is
that a defendant gets a free ride. However, the practice of
regulating externalities2 2 makes less sense in the intellectual
property context than in the real property context.20 3 If "freeriding" means merely gaining a benefit from another's

199. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 217. For example, the Nabisco court found
that Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish cracker was arbitrary and therefore was
inherently distinctive. Id. at 218. It also found that there was sufficient
similarity between the Goldfish cracker and Nabisco's cracker. Id. Thus, the
court could reasonably infer that the use of Nabisco's mark was likely to dilute
Pepperidge Farm's mark if it were allowed to continue. Id. at 222.
200. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th
Cir. 2000), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S.
418 (2003). In assessing the fame of the senior mark, the court noted that in
addition to receiving a high level of media coverage, Eli Lilly's PROZAC had
been the subject of bestselling books such as Elizabeth Wurtzel's ProzacNation:
Young and Depressed in America (1994). Id. Based on this evidence, the court
agreed that PROZAC had achieved a high degree of fame in American culture.
Id.
201. After all, the FTDA protects "famous marks" and defines dilution as "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services." Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-98, §§ 3-4, 109
Stat. 985, 985-86 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127
(2000)).
202. Externalities are secondary or unintended consequences. An example of
a negative externality of manufacturing is pollution.
203. This is because the externalities in intellectual property are positive.
See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding (Stanford
Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 291,
2004), availableat httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=582602.
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investment, intellectual property law should not prohibit freeriding when ideas and information cannot be depleted. °4
If a famous store is situated next to an obscure store and
the famous store drives traffic to the obscure store, that does
not mean the famous store's owner has the right to capture
the value of that extra patronage to the lesser-known store.20 5
In addition, this does not necessarily mean that the obscure
store steals any business that would have gone to the famous
store. This concept applies to a lesser-known mark that
benefits from association with a famous mark. By getting a
free ride, the lesser-known mark does not necessarily harm
the famous mark.20 6
Thus, when determining whether
dilution has occurred, or is likely to occur, a famous mark's
degree of recognition is of questionable value.
3. Non-essentialFactors-PredatoryIntent and Direct
Evidence
The fifth factor of the TDRA provides that courts may
consider "[wihether the user of the mark or trade name
20 7
intended to create an association with the famous mark."
This factor essentially asks courts to consider the predatory
intent of the junior user. "Predatory intent" is a defendant's
desire to trade on the reputation or goodwill of a plaintiffs
mark.20 8 It should not matter whether a defendant does this
willfully; the purpose of the FTDA is to protect against the
"lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify or
distinguish goods and services ..."209 Certainly, a defendant
can harm the ability of the plaintiffs mark to identify or
distinguish its goods or services without intending to do so.
204. See id. at 12-38.
205. Id. at 22. Lemley also uses the activity of planting trees to illustrate
this point. Id. He points out that governments rarely restrict the planting of
trees, as it is an act that usually generates only positive externalities. Id. at 23.
It is typically only when, in a particular context, it causes negative
externalities, that they do regulate it. Id. For example, the tree may be
blocking someone's view or interfering with power lines. Id.
206. Cf id. at 25-26 (stating that use of an idea "is not something from which
others can easily be excluded" and "the use of those ideas or words does no harm
to their creator").
207. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2006).
208. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 875 F.2d 1026,
1037 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring).
209. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 4, 109
Stat. 985, 986 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
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The sixth factor states that courts may look to "[a]ny
actual association between the mark or trade name and the
famous mark."2 10 This factor allows courts to consider direct
evidence when evaluating whether there is a likelihood of
dilution. Since it is possible to find a likelihood of dilution by
examining only circumstantial evidence, 2 1' this factor is not
critical to the test. However, it is useful because it gives
courts the option of considering forms of direct evidence (e.g.,
consumer surveys) if such evidence is available. Like the fifth
factor, this factor is not critical, though it may add to the
robustness of the overall balancing test.
D. Mandatory v. Permissive Language of the TDRA
The multi-factor balancing test proposed by the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 cannot ensure that
lower courts will consistently determine a likelihood of
dilution. Though courts will not ignore any of the factors,
they could also conceivably add other factors since the list is
not exhaustive. Congress's use of permissive language in the
TDRA thus leaves room for variation among courts.
V. PROPOSAL: How CONGRESS SHOULD RESPOND TO MOSELEY
A. Lower Moseley's Standard to "Likelihood of Dilution"
The Supreme Court in Moseley stated that although the
actual dilution standard increases the burden of proof and
decreases the plaintiffs odds of gaining relief under the
FTDA, the Court was still required to fulfill its responsibility
to interpret statutes as written by the legislature." 2 Because
the Court's decision rested on the express language of the
FTDA, Congress should amend the language of the FTDA to
require only a "likelihood of dilution" to circumvent this
literal interpretation and bring the language of the statute
back in line with its intent.
At present, Congress is considering the proposed TDRA,

210. H.R. 683.
211. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (noting
that "[it may well be, however, that direct evidence of dilution such as
consumer surveys will not be necessarily if actual dilution can reliably be

proved through circumstantial evidence").
212. See id.; see also Pulliam, supra note 7, at 908.
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which would do exactly that. The TDRA amends the FTDA to
require only a likelihood of dilution in order to grant an
injunction.21 3 Such a standard comports with the goal of
protecting trademark owners from the incremental harm of
dilution.2 14
Rather than requiring plaintiffs to produce
evidence of the harm already inflicted upon their marks, the
likelihood of dilution standard allows courts to identify and
respond to a potential problem of dilution before it has a
chance to begin.2 15
B. Modify the TDRA's Uniform Test for Dilution
In addition to the implementation of a lower standard for
dilution, Congress should modify its test for dilution so as to
harmonize the standards used among the lower courts.
Accordingly, the proposed six-factor test should be modified to
treat the non-essential factors as permissive, rather than
compulsory.
Specifically, the essential considerations of
similarity and distinctiveness should be mandatory.2 16
Finding a similarity between the junior and senior marks
ensures a causal relationship between the use of a junior
mark and dilution of a senior mark. Distinctiveness should
also be required. Without it, a senior mark has nothing that
Requiring these factors
a junior mark could dilute.
guarantees that lower courts will consider the most critical
factors when evaluating whether there is a likelihood of
dilution, and will thereby limit variation among courts'
findings.
Predatory intent and direct evidence are non-essential
factors. 1 7 Predatory intent is an unnecessary factor because
defendants can harm the ability of a plaintiffs mark to
identify and distinguish its goods and services regardless of
whether the defendant's intentions. Since it is possible to
find a likelihood of dilution by presenting only circumstantial
Therefore,
evidence, direct evidence is not necessary.
predatory intent and direct evidence should remain
213. H.R. 683.
214. See supra Part II.B (discussing the policies underlying trademark
dilution).
215. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 467-68 (7th
Cir. 2000), overruled in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
216. See supra Part IV.C.1.
217. See supra Part JV.C.3.
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permissive factors because they are marginally useful, but
there is no harm if courts do not consider these factors.
Finally, Congress should eliminate the fourth factor of
the TDRA regarding fame. This factor essentially punishes
free riding. However, in the intellectual property context,
free riding is not necessarily undesirable or harmful to the
plaintiff.2 1 It is a positive externality, and thus there is no
need to regulate it.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's adoption of an actual dilution
standard in Moseley is problematic. Under this standard,
plaintiffs are held to a virtually impossible level of proof.
Moreover, by making it more difficult to gain relief under the
FTDA, the actual dilution standard thwarts Congress's intent
to protect trademark owners' economic investments.
Because the Supreme Court relied heavily on a literal
interpretation of the FTDA which required an actual dilution
standard,2 19 Congress should amend the language of the
FTDA. Specifically, Congress should amend the FTDA to
require a "likelihood of dilution" as opposed to actual dilution.
Easing this burden of proof would realign the FTDA with its
underlying policies.
Additionally, Congress should prescribe a uniform multifactor test for determining when dilution is likely. The
proposed TDRA's six factors provide loose guidance rather
than a uniform multi-factor test so that courts may better
determine when dilution is likely.
Thus, the task of
determining whether dilution is likely remains effectively in
the lower courts' discretion. To ensure a more uniform result,
Congress should change the "essential" permissive factors to
compulsory factors. Finally, Congress should eliminate the
fame of the mark as a consideration.
If used in concert, the amended dilution standard and a
modified version of the TDRA's test for dilution should
preserve the tension between protection of famous
trademarks and the advancement of enterprise and
competition.

218. See supra Part IV.C.2.
219. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003).

